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Abstract
Through a severe accident at nuclear power plant Angra 2, the whole body dose
effective of the individuals members of the public located in the Emergency
Planning Zones (EPZs) will be calculated, and later, the protective actions in these
EPZs will be analyzed. Two different scenarios of radionuclide release into the
atmosphere will be considered. In the first scenario, 2 h of the release of Xe, Cs,
Ba, and Te, and the second scenario, 168 h of release.
Keywords: MELCOR, CALPUFF, atmospheric dispersion, nuclear power plant,
public individuals dose
1. Introduction
From the nuclear accidents that occurred in the world [1–3], the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), together with the licensing bodies of countries that
use nuclear energy, requested that they carry out computer simulations of some
accidents that are considered credible for their facilities, in order to verify their
integrity when subjected to such events.
These accidents are known as the design basis, in other words, accidents of loss
of primary coolant by large or small ruptures at points in the primary circuit, whose
probability of occurrence is critical to the system. It was after the accident at Unit 2
of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant (TMI) in 1979 that it was necessary to study
the more severe accidents.
These severe accidents are those in which substantial damage is expected in the
reactor core [4]. The knowledge of accidents with core meltdown is based on the
simulations with computer programs of the type MARCH [5], APRIL [6], MELCOR
[7–9], SCADAP/RELAP5 [10–11], and MAAP4 [12]. Among these programs,
MELCOR, SCDAP/RELAP5, and MAAP4 are widely used for the integral analysis of
the melted material in the core and the consequences in the lower part of the
pressure vessel [13].
In the event of a severe accident, followed by successive failures of physical
barriers and problems in the control and protection systems of the reactor, the
release of radioactive material into the atmosphere may become significant. The
problems generated by these catastrophic events can lead to an increase in levels of
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radioactivity in the vicinity of the plant, representing a threat to the society and
local life.
Therefore, the dispersion study can generate results with impacts on the occu-
pation and dimensioning of the site. Also in this context, it is important to remem-
ber that the severity of a possible accident associated with nuclear facilities in
general is strongly linked to population density of the regions around the facility, as
well as, evacuation policy, medical treatment, and other health measures which
should be taken to mitigate its radiological consequences.
2. Description of the accident
A typical PWR modeling was developed by the German company, GRS (Global
Research for Safety), and supplied to CNEN, as shown in Figure 1. This modeling
was chosen, in this study, for the purpose of performing an independent analysis of
severe accidents in ANGRA 2 nuclear power plant (NPP). However, although this
typical PWR of the GRS is similar to ANGRA 2 NPP, they are not identical, so that
an adaptation of the modeling was necessary in order to apply it for analysis of
severe accidents in NPP, ANGRA 2. For this reason, a considerable part of this study
was dedicated for the adaptation of the modeling.
2.1 Description of the simulated accident scenario
In this study is presented a loss of coolant accident, in other words, Small Break
LOCA (SBLOCA), in the hot leg. In this case, it is postulated that the rupture
occurs in loop 1. The area of the rupture in the hot leg is 380 cm2. The total flow
area of the piping connected to the pressure vessel is 4418 cm2, so that the area of
the rupture is less than 10% of the piping area; reason why the rupture of 380 cm2
is considered small.
The SBLOCA alone would not be sufficient to result in a severe accident, as long
as the various plant safety systems were available. It was, therefore, necessary to
add some aggravating conditions in order to cause the mentioned severe accident.
Figure 1.
PWR primary and secondary circuit modeling.
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These conditions are conventionally known as boundary conditions. The postulated
conditions are as follows:
a. Turbine bypass unavailable;
b. Condenser not available;
c. Loss of suction from sump and residual heat removal – RHR;
d. Injection of the Emergency Core Cooling System – ECCS from Refueling
Water Storage Tank – RWST by Safety Injection Pump – SIP e do RHR
available; and
e. All accumulators are available.
These boundary conditions, together with the primary circuit breakage, are
sufficient to result in total core melting. Two mitigating measures were modeled in
this study: Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner – PAR and Filtered Containment
Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq Cs-137 Bq Ba-133 m Bq Te-127 Bq
C1 – 2 h 2,11E+10 5,28E+01 1,40E+04 3,65E+06
C2 – 168 h 8,17E+19 1,56E+07 7,39E+10 2,00E+12
Table 1.
Source term for scenarios C1 and C2.
Figure 2.
Flow path (CV990 and CV991) of the radionuclides to the atmosphere.
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Venting System – FCVS, with the purpose of evaluating their validity and
efficiencies.
The inputs of the simulations performed for this work were elaborated using the
input provided by GRS. This original input was modified according to the imposed
conditions. It was assumed that the rupture occurs only in the Control Volume (CV)
number 200, that is, in CV200 of loop 1, shown in Figure 1.
The flow path, given by FL070, has its opening and closing controlled by a
CF660 control function. The setpoint for the valve opening is 7.0 bar and occurs
after 168 h of simulation, but the setpoint for closing has not been implemented. It
should be noted that the opening of the CV990 flow path, see Figure 2, occurs only
after 168 h of simulation.
The flow path CV990 and CV991, see Figure 2, contains filters for aerosols and
for fission products vapors so that some fraction of radionuclides are withdrawn
through these filters when the vapors and aerosols are transported along of the flow
path. A single filter can remove only one type of fission products, whether aerosols
or vapors, but not both.
The radionuclide package of the MELCOR code contains a simple filter model
which efficiency is defined by the global decontamination factor (DFG) determined
by the user. The decontamination value assumed for aerosol filter was 1000, and for
vapors of fission products, vapors were 100, which equated to 99.9 and 99.0%
filtration, respectively.
2.2 Source term
The source term represents the radioactive inventory located in a system,
equipment or component, which serves as a reference to evaluate the safety
aspects in different conditions of operation of the reactor. It also represents one of
the most important design bases for the study of installation performance,
distribution of fission products in reactor systems, and in the environment in
case of accidents.
Knowing the source term, there is the possibility of modeling radionuclide
dispersion, calculating radiation concentrations and doses, as well as spatializing
affected areas and environments. The source term of the present study is based on
the radionuclides used in the MELCOR output, being this Xenon-133 m, Césiso-
137, Barium-133 m, and Tellurium-127. Table 1 shows the activities of the
radionuclides for the scenarios C1 – simulation time of 2 h and C2 – simulation
time of 168 h.
3. Characterization of the study area
The study area is placed in the south coast of Rio de Janeiro State, known region
as “Costa Verde,” in the city of Angra dos Reis, where the CNAAA is placed zone
(23 k), latitude-UTM (7455581.00 m S), and longitude-UTM (555471.00 m E). The
region geomorphology is extremely hilly, with quite steep slopes, high or negatives
steepness and differences in elevations up to 800 m.
The geomorphology has two units of topography, one formed by ridge and
scarps, and the other, by lowlands. The scarps has an average gap of 700 m and are
dissected by half parallel valleys, which alternate with stretches of deep cutouts,
between the rivers that flow down the mountain. Figure 3 [14] shows the topogra-
phy of the region.
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4. Methodology
The use of mathematical models facilitates the simulation process of transport
mechanisms and pollutant deposition. These models provide a conservative
theoretical estimate of the concentration levels of pollutants in the air, making it
possible to evaluate the spatial and temporal evolution of these pollutants in the
atmosphere.
4.1 Atmospheric model: WRF/CALMET
The WRF – Weather Research and Forecasting, is a numerical modeling system,
developed for the weather forecasting and study of atmospheric phenomena of
micro and mesoscale. Its development is the result of the collaboration between US
research and government agencies centers: National Center for Atmospheric
Research (NCAR), National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP),
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), US Departement of
Defense, Oklahoma University, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The CALMET – California Meteorological Model, is a three-dimensional meteo-
rological model that is integrated with the dispersion model – CALPUFF. The
CALPOST is a post-processing package that makes possible to calculate the average
concentration and deposition fluxes [15].
The CALMET is classified as a diagnostic meteorological model that incorporates
meteorological observations and/or outputs of predictive meteorological models to
Figure 3.
Topography of the study area.
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produce, through objective analysis techniques, velocity, temperature, and other
variables necessary for simulations with the CALPUFF model.
The CALMET requires that the meteorological and geophysical data are in spe-
cific formats before being used. The processing of these data is then performed with
the aid of the preprocessors which prepare the data for assimilation in the CALMET
processor.
4.2 Dispersion model: CALPUFF
The modeling of the atmospheric dispersion is a technique of simulation of the
phenomena that occurs in nature, allowing to estimate the concentration of the
pollutants in a set of points, based on a set of variables that influence them. The
modeling of atmospheric dispersion is useful not only in the identification of emit-
ting sources but also in the management of gaseous effluents and air quality, con-
stituting one of the techniques of evaluation of air quality indicated by the
environmental legislation.
The California Puff Model CALPUFF is a non-stationary puff model for disper-
sion simulations that can be used for a wide variety of applications in air quality
modeling studies. The model was proposed and reviewed by Scire et al. [15] and has
been adopted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency – EPA as a
regulatory model for environmental impact studies covering distances of 50–
300 km and including topography and complex meteorological systems.
The CALPUFF software is entirely public, designed to simulate release into the
atmosphere, and is used to predict the effects of an accident, thus enabling effective
emergency planning.
4.3 WRF/CALMET coupling
The choice of the WRF model configuration, as well as the domains, spatial
resolution, and grid nesting, were made to obtain necessary meteorological data for
the INPUT of the CALMET model. The initial and boundary conditions assimilated
by the WRF are derived from the GFS (Global Forecasting System Model) of the
National Centers for Environment Prediction (NCEP), whose spatial resolution is
0.5° (55 km) and a time resolution of 3 h. To compose the GFS domain, both
horizontally and vertically, a model for interpolation of the data is used. More
details about this model can be found in KALNAY et al. [16]. The GFS data can be
obtained for free from the electronic address. Link: https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/da
ta-access/model-data/model-datasets.
The meteorological data of the January month of 2009 was used for the simula-
tion with the WRF. The January month data was chosen, due to being the most
recent data obtained from Electronuclear for the four Angra towers.
The grid used by CALMET has a domain of 80 km and a cell number of 229 
229. In the region of the NPP, the wind field data of the Electronuclear Towers was
used, which radius of influence is 5 km.
4.4 Whole body dose calculation
The whole body dose is the contribution of the internal dose (inhalation or
ingestion) added to the external dose (plume immersion) [17]. The calculations of
the exposure pathways are in equations (Eqs. (1) and (2)), respectively. For the
present study, the whole body dose analysis considered the plume concentration
value and exposure time in the Emergency Planning Zones – EPZ, as shown in
Figure 4.
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4.4.1 Inhalation dose calculation
The inhalation dose calculation was based on the IAEA-TecDoc-1162 [18]




∁i ∗ e gð Þi ∗Br ∗T (1)
Where:
Din = Inhalation dose, Sv;P
i∁i = Concentration of each radionuclide – Bq/m
3;
e gð Þi = Inhalation dose coefficient – Sv/Bq (was used e(g)i for adult e(g)
i > 17 years), according to Regulatory Position CNEN 3.01/011:2011 [19];
Br = Breathing rate, whose value considered 1.5 m3/h [18]; and
T = Exposure time – h (time the individual of the public will be exposed to the
pollutant).
4.4.2 Immersion dose calculation
The immersion dose calculation was based on the IAEA-TecDoc-1162 [18]




∁i ∗ e gð Þi ∗T (2)
Where:
Din = Immersion dose, Sv;P
i∁i = Concentration of each radionuclide – Bq/m
3;
e gð Þi = Immersion dose coefficient – Sv.m
3/Bq.h (was used e(g)i for adult e(g)
i > 17 years), according to Regulatory Position CNEN 3.01/011:2011 [19]; and
Figure 4.
Regions in EPZ that will be considered the dose calculation and measures protective.
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T = Exposure time – h (time the individual of the public will be exposed to the
pollutant).
5. Results
5.1 Pollutant transport model: CALPUFF
The simulations were performed on CALPUFF assuming a point source of emis-
sions related to the chimney of the NPP Angra 2, which height considered was 155
m. The emission rate will follow scenarios C1 and C2, with the constant release rate
of the radionuclides released into the atmosphere.
5.1.1 Radionuclides release for scenario C1
The simulation was performed from 05/01/2009 to 08/01/2009 at 06:00 h. It
was considered that all the radionuclides of Table 1, after release, behave according
to the region’s wind field during the entire simulation period, 72 h. The respective
plume concentration periods that were considered: 1, 3, and 72 h, for each EPZ, see
Tables 2–5. Figure 5 shows the wind field and radionuclides transport from Table 1
for scenario C1.
5.1.2 Radionuclides release for scenario C2
The simulation was performed from 05/01/2009 to 08/01/2009 at 06:00 h. It
was considered that all the radionuclides of Table 1, after release, behave according
Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq/m3 Cs-137 Bq/m3 Ba-133 m Bq/m3 Te-127 Bq/m3
1 h 1,53E+04 3,76E-05 9,97E-03 2,60E+00
3 h 6,04E+03 1,48E-05 3,92E-03 1,02E+00
72 h 5,64E+02 1,21E-06 3,22E-04 8,39E-02
Table 2.
Radionuclides concentration in EPZ-3 km (Praia Brava).
Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq/m3 Cs-137 Bq/m3 Ba-133 m Bq/m3 Te-127 Bq/m3
1 h 1,00E+04 2,37E-05 6,29E-03 1,64E+00
3 h 4,30E+03 9,22E-06 2,45E-03 6,37E-01
72 h 1,08E+03 2,15E-06 5,71E-04 1,49E-01
Table 3.
Radionuclides concentration in EPZ-5 km (Frade).
Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq/m3 Cs-137 Bq/m3 Ba-133 m Bq/m3 Te-127 Bq/m3
1 h 1,54E+03 3,55E-06 9,41E-04 2,45E-01
3 h 9,34E+02 2,16E-06 5,74E-04 1,50E-01
72 h 1,60E+02 2,92E-07 7,75E-05 2,02E-02
Table 4.
Radionuclides concentration in EPZ-10 km (Mambucaba).
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to the region’s wind field during the entire simulation period, 72 h. The respective
plume concentration periods that were considered: 1, 3, and 72 h, for each EPZ, see
Tables 6–9. Figure 6 shows the wind field and radionuclides transport from
Table 1 for scenario C2.
5.2 Whole body dose in EPZ
• Whole body dose analysis for Scenario C1
Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq/m3 Cs-137 Bq/m3 Ba-133 m Bq/m3 Te-127 Bq/m3
1 h 1,09E+03 1,49E-06 3,96E-04 1,03E-01
3 h 8,29E+02 1,16E-06 3,07E-04 8,01E-02
72 h 2,21E+02 2,83E-07 7,51E-05 1,96E-02
Table 5.
Radionuclides concentration in EPZ-15 km (Angra dos Reis).
Figure 5.
Concentration and wind field for scenario C1.
Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq/m3 Cs-137 Bq/m3 Ba-133 m Bq/m3 Te-127 Bq/m3
1 h 5,92E+13 1,11E+01 5,27E+04 1,43E+06
3 h 2,34E+13 4,37E+00 2,07E+04 5,60E+05
72 h 2,18E+12 3,58E-01 1,70E+03 4,60E+04
Table 6.
Radionuclides concentration in EPZ-3 km (Praia Brava).
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Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq/m3 Cs-137 Bq/m3 Ba-133 m Bq/m3 Te-127 Bq/m3
1 h 5,97E+12 1,05E+00 4,97E+03 1,34E+05
3 h 3,62E+12 6,39E-01 3,03E+03 8,20E+04
72 h 6,18E+11 8,64E-02 4,09E+02 1,11E+04
Table 8.
Radionuclides concentration in EPZ-10 km (Mambucaba).
Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq/m3 Cs-137 Bq/m3 Ba-133 m Bq/m3 Te-127 Bq/m3
1 h 4,23E+12 4,42E-01 2,09E+03 5,66E+04
3 h 3,21E+12 3,42E-01 1,62E+03 4,39E+04
72 h 8,57E+11 8,37E-02 3,96E+02 1,07E+04
Table 9.
Radionuclides concentration in EPZ-15 km (Angra dos Reis).
Figure 6.
Concentration and wind field for scenario C2.
Simulation time Xe-133 m Bq/m3 Cs-137 Bq/m3 Ba-133 m Bq/m3 Te-127 Bq/m3
1 h 3,88E+13 7,01E+00 3,32E+04 8,99E+05
3 h 1,66E+13 2,72E+00 1,29E+04 3,49E+05
72 h 4,19E+12 6,36E-01 3,01E+03 8,16E+04
Table 7.
Radionuclides concentration in EPZ-5 km (Frade).
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For the dose calculation, were used the equations (Eqs. (1) and (2)), and the
exposure time to individual members of the public was 1, 3, and 72 h. It was
considered that these individual members of the public are not under any protec-
tion and the plume exposure is 100%. Table 10 shows the dose values for each
exposure time, as well as for each EPZ.
• Whole body dose analysis for Scenario C2
For the dose calculation, were used the equations (Eqs. (1) and (2)), and the
exposure time to individual members of the public was 1, 3, and 72 h. It was
considered that these individual members of the public are not under any protec-
tion and the plume exposure is 100%. Table 11 shows the dose values for each
exposure time, as well as for each EPZ.
6. Conclusions
According to the PEE/RJ [20] – External Emergency Plan of the State of Rio de
Janeiro, in order to prioritize the risks and facilitate the planning and implementation
of protection measures recommended by CNEN, the concept of EPZ was adopted. The
Emergency Planning Zones were subdivided into circular crowns as shown in Figure 4.
According to the PEE/RJ, the preventive evacuation of the population consti-
tutes an effective protection measure up to the distance of 5 km around the plant.
From this distance, no additional benefit will be obtained with the preventive
evacuation. Thus, to the EPZ 10 km and EPZ 15 km, it is preferable to recommend,
in the short term, that the population remains sheltered. In this sense, the existing
rays are classified as follows:
• Preventive action zones
EPZ 3 km: circumscribed area from 3 km centered on the nuclear unit of




EPZ 3 km Praia
Brava (mSv)




EPZ 15 km Angra
dos Reis (mSv)
1 h 7,06E-05 4,63E-05 7,12E-06 5,04E-06
3 h 8,38E-05 5,96E-05 1,29E-05 1,15E-05
72 h 1,94E-04 3,60E-04 5,31E-05 7,35E-05
Table 10.




EPZ 3 km Praia
Brava (mSv)




EPZ 15 km Angra
dos Reis (mSv)
1 h 2,73E+05 1,79E+05 2,75E+04 1,95E+04
3 h 3,24E+05 2,30E+05 5,00E+04 4,44E+04
72 h 7,25E+05 1,39E+06 2,05E+05 2,84E+05
Table 11.
Whole body dose in EPZ for scenario C2.
11
Calculation of the Dose for Public Individuals Due to a Severe Accident at the Angra 2 Nuclear…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.92200
EPZ 5 km: circular crown, centered on the nuclear unit of CNAAA, with a 5 km
outside radius and inner radius of 3 km. This EPZ 5 km is defined as the impact
zone.
• Environmental control zones
EPZ 10 km: circular crown, centered on the nuclear unit of CNAAA with a
10 km outer radius and inner radius of 5 km.
EPZ 15 km: circular crown, centered on the nuclear unit of CNAAA with a 15 km
outer radius and inner radius of 10 km.
According to a CNEN study [21], the protection measures for CNAAA can be
divided as follows:
a. Area emergency: EPZ 3 km and EPZ 5 km (notification to the population to
remain in residences or workplace, awaiting instructions) and EPZ 10 km and
EPZ 15 km (notification to the population to keep on the alert for further
instructions, keeping their normal activities); and
b. General Emergency: EPZ 3 km (population evacuation), EPZ 5 km (keep
population sheltered), EPZ 10 km and EPZ 15 km (notification to the
population to remain in the residences or workplace, awaiting instructions).
Based on the dose values for sheltered and evacuation of Regulatory Position
CNEN 3.01/006: 2011 [22], whose values are 10 mSv for sheltered and 50 mSv for
evacuation, will be recommended the protection measures for each EPZ for scenar-
ios C1 and C2, as shown in Tables 12 and 13. The recommendations in Table 12
were based on the projected doses of Table 10 and the recommendations in
Table 13 were based on the projected doses of Table 11.
It is observed in Table 12 that for the Preventive Action Zones (EPZ 3 km and
EPZ 5 km) and Environmental Control Zones (EPZ 10 km and EPZ 15 km), the
recommendations of the protective measures that best meet the dose levels is
Sheltered in place. The Scenario C1 is characterized as Area Emergency, having as a
measure of the local authorities the notification to the population to remain in their
residences or workplace, awaiting future instructions.
C1 exposure
time






EPZ 15 km Angra dos
Reis
1 h Sheltered Sheltered Sheltered Sheltered
3 h Sheltered Sheltered Sheltered Sheltered
72 h Sheltered Sheltered Sheltered Sheltered
Table 12.
Recommendations for protection measures in EPZ for scenario C1.
C2 exposure
time






EPZ 15 km Angra dos
Reis
1 h Evacuation Evacuation Evacuation Evacuation
3 h Evacuation Evacuation Evacuation Evacuation
72 h Evacuation Evacuation Evacuation Evacuation
Table 13.
Recommendations for protection measures in EPZ for scenario C2.
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It is observed in Table 13 that for the Preventive Action Zones (EPZ 3 km and
EPZ 5 km) and Environmental Control Zones (EPZ 10 km and EPZ 15 km), the
recommendations of the protective measures that best meet the dose levels is
Evacuation. The Scenario C2 is characterized as a General Emergency, having as a
measure of the local authorities the evacuation of the population in EPZ.
In summary, it is possible to conclude that:
• Scenario C1 it is observed the occurrence of an Area Emergency, having as a
protective measure in all EPZ, Sheltered in place.
• Scenario C2 it is observed the occurrence of a General Emergency, having as a
protective measure in all EPZ, Evacuation;
• The impact zone that is currently 5 km, covering the Preventive Action Zones,
for scenario C2, has the extension of this impact zone for distances beyond
5 km; and
• Analyzing the C1 and C2 scenarios, it is inferred that the faster the accident is
mitigated, the lower will be the radiological consequences and therefore, the
actions to the protective measures will be lighter.
Advance planning is essential to identify potential problems that may occur in
an evacuation. The NRC case study cites the following aspects of planning as
contributing to efficiency and effectiveness of evacuation [23]:
• High level of cooperation among agencies;
• Use of multiple forms of emergency communications;
• Community familiarity with alerting methods, the nature of the hazard and
evacuation procedures;
• Community communication; and
• Well-trained emergency responders.
However, if environmental monitoring confirms that the population’s exposure
will extend beyond a few days, justifying other protection actions beyond shelter
and evacuation, temporary or permanent resettlement should be considered [22].
13
Calculation of the Dose for Public Individuals Due to a Severe Accident at the Angra 2 Nuclear…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.92200
Author details
André Silva de Aguiar*, Seung Min Lee and Gaianê Sabundjian
Nuclear and Energy Research Institute (IPEN/CNEN - SP), São Paulo, SP, Brazil
*Address all correspondence to: aguiargm@gmail.com
©2020TheAuthor(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms
of theCreativeCommonsAttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0),which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in anymedium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
14
Nuclear Power Plants - Processes in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
References
[1] Corey GR. A brief review of the
accident at three mile island. IAEA




[2] Chernobyl’s Legacy. Health,
Environmental and Socio-Economic
Impacts and Recommendations to the
Governments of Belarus, the Russian
Federation and Ukraine. Vienna: IAEA;
2003-2005
[3]Gauntt R, Kalinich D, Cardoni J,
Phillips J, Goldmann A, Pickering S,
et al. Fukushima Daiichi Accident
Study. Sandia Report SAND2012–6173;
2012





[Accessed: 20 October 2019]
[5]Wooton RO, Cybuiskis P, Quayle SF.
MARCH2 (meltdown accident response
characteristics). In: Code Description
and User’s Manual. Washington, D.C.:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1984.
(NUREG/CR-3988)
[6]Kim SH, KimDH, Koh BR, Pessanha J,
Siahmed EL-K, Podowski MZ, et al. The
Development of APRIL.MOD2 – A
Computer Code for Core Meltdown
Accident Analysis of Boiling Water
Nuclear Reactors. NUREG/CR-5157,
ORNL/Sub/81–9089/3; 1988
[7]U.S.NRC – Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. MELCOR Computer Code
Manuals. Sandia National Laboratories.
NUREG/CR-6119; 1990
[8] Gauntt RO, Cole RK, et al. MELCOR
computer code manuals. NUREG/CR-
6119, Rev. 1. USA: National Laboratory;
1998
[9] Gauntt RO, Cole RK, et al. MELCOR
Computer Code Manuals. Vo1. 2:
Reference Manuals, Version 1.8.5,
Prepared by Sandia National
Laboratories (SNL) for the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research, NUREG/
CR-6119, Vo1. 2, Re’v. 2; 2000
[10] Allison CM, et al. SCDAP/RELAPS/
MOD3.1 code manual. Volume II:
Damage Progression Model Theory,
Technical Report NUREG/CR-6150,
EGG-2720. USA: INEL; 1993
[11] Alliso NCM, et al. SCDAP/RELAPS/
MOD3.2 Code Manual. Volume I-V,
NUREG/CR-6150, INEL 96/0422,
Revision 1; 1997
[12]MAAP4: Modular Accident Analysis
Program for LWR Plants. Code Manual
Vols. 1–4, Prepared by Fauske &
Associates, Inc., Burr Ridge, IL, USA for
the EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, USA; 1994
[13] Lamarsh JR. Introduction to Nuclear
Reactor Theory. New york University:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company;
1975
[14]Aguiar AS, Lamego Simoes Filho FF,
Alvim ACM, Pimentel LCG,
Moraes NO. Station Blackout in unit 1
and analysis of the wind field in the
region of Angra dos Reis. Annals of
Nuclear Energy [Internet]. Elsevier BV;
April 2015;78:93-103. DOI: 10.1016/j.
anucene.2014.12.010
[15] Scire JS et al. A user’s Guide for the
CALPUFF DispersionModel. (Version 5).
Land O’Lakes, Florida, USA: Earth Tech.
Inc; 2000
[16] Kalnay E, Kanamitsu M, Kistler R,
Collins W, Deaven D, Gandin L, et al.
The NCEP/NCAR 40-year reanalysis




Calculation of the Dose for Public Individuals Due to a Severe Accident at the Angra 2 Nuclear…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.92200
[17]U.S. NRC – Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Dose Standards and
Methods for Protection against
Radiation and Contamination. USNRC
Technical Training Center
[18] IAEA – International Atomic Energy
Agency. Generic Procedures for
Assessment and Response during a
Radiological Emergency. TECDOC-1162
[19] CNEN – Comissão Nacional de
Energia Nuclear. Coeficientes de Dose
para Exposição do Público. Posição
Regulatória; 2011
[20] SESDEC – Secretaria de Estado de
Saúde e Defesa Civil. Plano de
Emergência Externo do Estado do Rio de
Janeiro. Para Caso de Emergência
Nuclear nas Instalações da Central
Nuclear Almirante Álvaro Alberto
(CNAAA); 2008
[21] CNEN – Comissão Nacional de
Energia Nuclear. Plano de Emergência
Setorial – CNAAA. CGRN/DRS.
Seminário Plano de Emergência –
Marinha do Brasil; 2011
[22] CNEN – Comissão Nacional de
Energia Nuclear. Medidas de Proteção e
Critérios de Intervenção em Situações
de Emergência. Posição Regulatória;
2011
[23]U.S. NRC – Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Identification and Analysis




Nuclear Power Plants - Processes in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
